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العنوان
The role of corporate governance and earnings management in predicting bank riskiness /
الناشر
Sabah Abdelhakkam Alsayed Soliman ,
المؤلف
Sabah Abdelhakkam Alsayed Soliman
هيئة الاعداد
باحث / Sabah Abdelhakkam Alsayed Soliman
مشرف / Mohamed Hassan Abdelazim
مشرف / Mohamed Hassan Abdelazim
مشرف / Mohamed Hassan Abdelazim
تاريخ النشر
2021
عدد الصفحات
106 Leaves ;
اللغة
الإنجليزية
الدرجة
الدكتوراه
التخصص
المحاسبة
تاريخ الإجازة
1/1/2021
مكان الإجازة
جامعة القاهرة - كلية التجارة - Department of Accounting
الفهرس
Only 14 pages are availabe for public view

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Abstract

This research investigates the usefulness of corporate governance and earnings managementin predicting bank riskiness within an emerging market context.Board of directors’ attributes and functionality are proxies for corporate governance. Earnings management ismeasuredusing a two-stage OLS regression which reflects the combined effect ofdiscretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary realized security gains and losses. Bank riskiness is reflected through two proxies; namely,Z-Score which is used as an accounting-based risk measureand stock return volatility whichis a market-based risk measure.Three prediction models of bank riskiness are testedwhile controlling for the bank-specific, regulatory, political and economic characteristics.The sample consists of 21 banks; including publicly traded and state-owned banks, during 2012-2018in Egypt.The first model examinesthe ability of corporate governance to predict bank riskiness.The second model reflectsthe ability of earnings management topredict bank riskiness.Finally, the third modelinvestigatesthe impact of the interacting effect betweencorporate governance and earnings management onbank riskiness.Results indicatethat the second prediction model; the earnings management model, has the highest prediction power in case of an accounting-based risk measure.However, the third model; the interaction model, is the best in predicting bank riskiness in case of a market-based risk measure. Moreover, results reveal that bank riskiness decreases with the CEO/chairmanduality and increases with board size, foreign board directorship, and executive board directorship.Interestingly, the market reacts negatively to female board directorship. Additionally, where earnings management induces more riskiness, corporate governancediscipline banks by attenuating their riskiness